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THE WEBB ACT
The passage of the Webb Act over the President's veto during
the last days of Mr. Taft's administration again brings before the
public the long and hard fought struggle by the States to control
the traffic in intoxicating liquors within their borders. It is not
a struggle of interests, for those attempting to restrict liquor
within the State do not have as their opponents those interested
in the liquor business. It is.purely a contest of State rights
against the power which the States delegated to Congress of the
exclusive control of commerce between the States, and at each
passage at arms the delegated power has been triumphant. The
decisions of the Supreme Court ulon the Wilson Act of I89Co
took all the virility out of that law and left the States as unable.
to effectuate their regulatory and prohibitory laws as before, and'
the Webb Act is evidently intended to give the States the control'
over the problem which has been denied them by the decisions of'
the Courts.
The Webb Act is entitled "An Act to Divest Intoxicating-
Liquors of Their Interstate Commerce Character in Certain
Cases", and provides as follows: Be it enacted, etc., "that the
shipment or transportation in any manner or by any means what-
soever of any spirituous,'vinous, malted, fermented or other intox--
icating liquors of any kind from one State, Territory or District
of the United States, or place non-contiguous to, but subject to.
the jurisdiction thereof, into any other State, Territory, or Dis--
trict of the United States, or place non-contiguous to, but subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, which said spirit, vinous, malted, fer-.
mented or other intoxicating liquor is intended by any person in-
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terested therein to be received, possessed, sold or in any manner
used, either in the original package, or otherwise, in violation of
any law of such State, Territory or District of the United States,
or place non-contiguous to, but subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
is hereby prohibited."
The title to the act is the key to the purpose of its enactment.
It is intended to divest intoxicating liquors of their interstate
commerce character.
In order fully to understand the meaning of the act it is neces-
sary to have in mind what the interstate commerce character of
intoxicating liquors was at the time of the passage of the act.
The pi(opositions which have become firmly established in our
law are:
i. That the right of conducting traffic and commercial inter-
course between the States is independent of State control and
where freedom of commerce between the States is directly in-
volved, the non-action of Congress indicates its will that the com-
merce should be free and untrammeled and the States cannot
interfere therewith either through their police power or their
taxing power.'
2. That traffic in intoxicating liquors is not in itself unlawful,2
and such liquids are subjects of interstate commerce.3
3. That the States of the Union have a right to controD their
purely internal affairs and in so doing to protect the health, morals
and safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere
with the execution of the powers of the general government, or
violate rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.3
4. That Congress may by positive enactment suspend its
plenary power over the subjects of interstate commerce and divest
them bf that character.4
During the early history of this country the States did not pass
measures restrictive of the liquor business or of its use and abuse.
But when it was attempted to pass regulatory measures under
their police and taxing powers they were met by the principle as
laid down in the old case of Brown v. Marytand, 12 Wheaton,
.419, known as the "original package case." This rule held that
'Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U. S., 489 (1886) ; Judson Int. Com., Sec.
Ed., par. 37.
2 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100 (1890).
3 Mugler v. Kansas, 123"U. S., 623 (1887).
4 it re Rahncr, 140 U. S., 545 (1891).
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the State's power of regulation or taxation could not apply to
an importation as long as it remained in the original package in
which it was imported, and that the right to import carried with
it as an incident thereto the right to sell in the briginal package.
In other words, an importation was a subject of commerce as
long as it remained in the hands of the importer for sale in the
original package, and hence under the exclusive control of the
United States.
This rule was first touched upon relative to intoxicating liquors
in the famous License Cases, 5 Howard, 505, decided in 1847,
-where it was intimated by Chief Justice Taney that after liquor
passed the borders of a State it became amenable to State laws,
and though a State could not stop the importation of liquors
-within its borders, yet it is not bbund to furnish a market for
them, and may pass laws which deprive the importer of the right
to sell which the case of Brown v. Maryland had guaranteed to
him.
Thus the law stood for some years until the State of Iowa in
an endeavor to suppress the sale of liquor within its b'orders
passed an Act of April 5, 1886, which in terms forbade any com-
mon carrier to bring within the State of Iowa, for any person-or
corporation, any intoxicating liqtors from any other State or
Territory of the United States, without first having obtained a
certificate from an officer of the county of the destination of the
liquor that the consignee was authorized to sell liquor.
One Bowman offered a shipment'of 5,oo barrels of beer to
the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad for shipment into Iowa.
The railroad refused to receive the beer for shipment as no cer-
tificate as required by the act was furnished. Suit was biought
for the refusal and the act pleaded in defense. There was thus
-directly raised the issue of the effect of such State laws upon
interstate shipments of intoxicants and the status of the carrier
in the premises determined.
The Supreme Court in Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern
-Railroad Company, 125 U. S., 465 (1888), -held that such an act
was a regutation of commerce among the States and void, and
that such a statute donstitutes no defense to a carrier for refusing
to carry such contraband articles into the forbidden State.
Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the Court, con-
-curred in by Justice Field; Chief Justice White and Justices Har-
lan and Gray dissenting.
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"The-principle thus announced (exclusive control of interstate
commerce in Congress) has a more obvious application to the
circumstances of such a case as the present, when it is considered
that the law of the State of Iowa under consideration, while it
professes to regulate the conduct of carriers engaged in transpor-
tation within the limits of that State, nevertheless materially
affects, if allowed to operate, the conduct of such carriers, both a8
respects their rights and obligations, in every other State into or
through which they pass in the prosecution of their business of
interstate transportation. In the present case, the defendant is
sued as a common carrier in the State of Illinois, and the breach
of duty alleged against it is a violation of the law of that State in
refusing to receive and transport goods which, as a common car-
rier, by that law, it was bound to accept and carry. It interposes
as a defense a law of the State of Iowa, which forbids the de-
livery of such goods within that State. " Has the law of Iowa any
extra-territorial force which does not belong to the law of the
State of Illinois? If the law of Iowa forbids the delivery, and
the law of Illinois requires the transportation, which of the two
shall prevail? How can the former make void the latter?,
"It is conceded, as we have already shown, that for the pur-
poses of its policy a State has legislative control, exclusive of
Congress, within its territory of all persons, things, and trans-
actions of strictly internal concern. For the purpose of protect-
ing its people against the evils of intemperance it has the right
to prohibit the manufacture within its limits of intoxicating
liquors; it may also prohibit all domestic commerce in them be-
tween its own inhabitants, whether the articles are introduced
from other States or from foreign countries; it may punish those
who sell them in violation of its laws; it may adopt any measures
tending, even indirectly and remotely, to make the policy effective
until it passes the line of power delegated to Congress under the
Constitution. It cannot, without the consent of Congress, ex-
pressed or implied, regulate commerce between its people and
those of the other States of the Union in order to effect its end,
however desirable such a regulation might be.
"The statute of Iowa under consideration falls within this pro-
hibition. It is not an inspection law; it is not a quarantine or
sanitary law. It is essentially a regulation of commerce among
the States within any definition heretofore given to that term, or
which can be given; and although its motive and purpose are to
perfect the Policy of the State of Iowa in protecting its citizens
against the evils of intemperance, it is none the less on that ac-
count a regulation of commerce. If it had extended its pro-
visions so as to prohibit the introduction into the State from for-
eign countries of all importations of intoxicating liquors pro-
duced abroad, no one would doubt the nature of the provision as
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a regulation of foreign commerce. Its nature is not changed by
its application to commerce among the States.
"The section of the statute of Iowa, the validity of which is
drawn in question in this case, dbes not fall within this enumera-
tion of legitimate exertions of the police power. It is not an
exercise of the jurisdiction of the State over persons and prop-
erty within its limits. On the contrary, it is an attempt
to exert that jurisdiction over persons and property
within the limits of other States. It seeks to prohibit and
stop their passage and importation into its own limits, and is
designed as a regulation for the conduct of commerce before the
merchandise is brought to its border. It is not one of those local
regulations designed to aid and facilitate commerce; it is not
an inspection law to secure the due quality and measure of a
commodity; it is not a law to regulate or restrict the sale of an
article deemed injurious to the health and morals of the com-
munity; it is not a regulation confined to the purely internal and
domestic commerce of the State; it is not a restriction which
only operates upon property after it has become mingled with
and ftrms part of the mass of the property within the State. It
is, on the other hand, a regulation directly affecting interstate
commerce in an essential and vital point. If authorized, in the
present instance, upon the grounds and motives of the policy
which have dictated it, the same reason would justify any and every
other State regulation of interstate commerce upon any grounds
and reasons which might prompt in particular cases their adop-
tion. It is, therefore, a regulation of that character which con-
stitutes an unauthorized interference with the power given to
Congress over the subject. If not in contravention of any posi-
tive legislation by Congress, it is nevertheless a breach and inter-
ruption of that liberty of trade which Congress ordains as the
national policy, by willing that it shall be free from restrictive
regulations.
"It may be said, however, that the right of the State to restrict
or prohibit sales of intoxicating liquor within its limits, conceeded
to exist as a part of its police power, implies the right to prohibit
its importation because the latter is necessary to the effectual
exercise of the former. The argument is that a prohibition of
the sale cannot be made effective, except by preventing the intro-
duction of the subject of the sale; that if its entrance into the
State is permitted, the traffic in it cannot be suppressed. But
the right to prohibit sales, so far as conceded to the States, arises
only after the act of transportation has terminated, because the
sales which the State may forbid are of things within its juris-
diction. Its power over them does not begin to operate until
they are brought within the territorial limits which circumscribe
it. It might be very convenient and useful in the execution of
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the policy of prohibition within the State to extend the powers
of the State beyond its territorial limits. But such extra-terri-
torial powers cannot be assumed upon such an implication. On
the contrary, the nature of the case contradicts their existence;
for if they belong to one State they belong to all, and cannot be
exercised severally and independently. The attempt would neces-
sarily produce that conflict and confusion which it was the very
purpose of the Constitution by its delegations of national power
to prevent.
"It is easier to think that the right of importation from abroad,
and of transportation from one State to another, includes, by
necessary implication, the right of the importer to sell in un-
broken packages at the place where the transit terminates; for
the very purpose and motive of that branch of commerce which
consists in trahisportation is that other and consequent act of
commerce which consists in the sale and exchange of the com-
modities transported. Such, indeed, was the point decided in
the case of Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S., 12, as to foreign com-
merce, with the express statement, in the opinion of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, that the conclusion would be the same in a case of
commerce among the States. But it is not necessary now to
express any opinion upon the point, because that question- does
not arise in the present case. The precise line which divides the
transaction, so far as it belongs to foreign or interstate commerce,
from the internal and domestic commerce of the State, we are
not now called upon to delineate. It is enough to say that the
power to regulate or forbid the sale of a commodity, after it has
been brought into the States, does not carry with it the right and
power to prevent its introduction by transportation from another
State."
The Court thus left open the question as to when the pro-
hibitory State laws took effect upon the contraband shipment;
in other words, when the interstate attribute was lost.
The next important case upon the subject is that of Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S., 100 (i89o), which overruled the License Cases
and established the principle with respect to interstate shipments
of liquors which had been laid down in Brown v. Maryland as
to imports from foreign countries; that is, that the right to im-
port gives the right to sell in the original package.
The Court then advanced one step from the Bowman Case and
decided the point there left in suspense as to what extent the
shipment retained its interstate attribute by deciding that the
power vested in Congress to regulate commerce between the
States cannot be stopped at the State line but is capable of
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authorizing the disposition within the State of the thing im-
ported as long as it remains in the original package.
The States being thus hampered in their control over intoxi-
cants by the interpretation of their powers by the Supreme Court
of the United States, Congress passed an act which attempted to
give effect to State laws by divesting intoxicants of some of the
attributes of interstate commerce. This Act, known as the
Wilson Act, entitled, "An Act to Limit the Effect of the Regula-
tions of Commerce Between the Several States and With Foreign
Countries in Certain Cases," provided:
"That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or
liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining
therein for use, consumption, sale or -storage therein, shall upon
arrival in such State or Territory, be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exer-
cise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same man-
ner as though such liquors or liquids had been produced in such
State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason
of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise."
(26 Stat. L. 313.)"
This law was soon before the Supreme Court for interpreta-
tion in the case In re Rahrer, 140 U. S., 545, decided May 25,
189i. This was a test case in which Rahrer, a citizen of Kansas,
a dry State, had a pint of whiskey shipped to him from Missouri,
which he sold in Kansas in the original package as the agent of
the consignors. He was arrested. Upon habeas corpus pro-
ceedings the Wilson Act was held constitutional, the Court de-
ciding that Congress had the right to divest an article of com-
merce of its interstate attributes at an earlier time than would
otherwise be the case and that the act was not a delegation of the
powers of the United States to a State.
The next important interpretation of the Wilson Act was in
the Iowa case, decided in 1898, in which the effect thereof upon
a common carrier was determined. A shipment of liquor was
made from Illinois into Iowa against a statute of Iowa which
prohibited a common carrier, or its agent from transporting or
conveying intoxicating liquors between points within the State,
-unless furnished by a County officer with a certificate that the
consignee was authorized to deal in such liquors in such county.
5 Act of August 8, 1890, ch. 728, 26 Stat. L., 313; Fed. Stats. Ann., Vol.
3, page 853.
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The liquor was delivered to a railroad at Burlington by an
interstate carrier with which it had a traffic agreement on through
shipments. The Iowa road then carried it to a point further in
the State and unloaded it at its freight station. The agent who
took the package from the freight car to the warehouse was.
arrested for violating the act.
The question presented was whether the law of Iowa can be
made to apply to a shipment from Illinois before it has reached
its destination, that is, before it has reached the consignee.
In deciding the case, the word "arrival" as used in the Wilson
Act was analyzed and construed, and it was held to mean arrival
at the point of destination and in the hands of the consignee.
The principle as laid down in Bowman v. Railroad, that a
State law can have no extra-territorial effect and that a State
liquor law which attempted to attach to a shipment at the border
of a State is repugnant to the Constitution as controlling con-
tracts made in another State, was re-established.
In T. H. Rhoades v. State of Iowa, 170 U. S., 412 (1898),
Mr. Justice White said:
"Did the act :of Congress referred to operate to attach the legis-
lation of the State of Iowa to the goods in question the moment
they reached the State line, and before the completion of the act
of transportation, by arriving at the point of consignment and
the delivery there to the consignee, is, then, the pivotal question.
The Act of Congress is as follows: (Quoting the Act.)
"The words 'shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or
Territory,' in one sense might be held to mean arrival at the State
line. But to so interpret them would necessitate isolating these
words from the entire context of the act, and would compel a
construction destructive of other provisions contained therein.
But this would violate the fundamental rule requiring that a law
be construed as a whole, and not by distorting or magnifying a
particular word found in it. It is clearly contemplated that the
word 'arrival' signified that the goods should actually come into
the State, since it is provided that 'all fermented, distilled or other
intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into a State or Terri-
tory,' and this is further accentuated by the other provision, 'or
remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein."'
"This language makes it impossible in reason to hold that the
law intended that the word 'arrival' should mean at the State,
line, since it presupposes the coming of the goods into the State
for 'use, consumption, sale, or storage.' The fair inference from
the enumeration of these conditions, which are all embracing, is,
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that the time when they could arise was made the test by which
to determine the period when the operation of the State law
should attach to goods brought into the State. But to uphold
the meaning of the word 'arrival', which is necessary to support
the State law, as construed below, forces. the conclusion that the
Act of Congress in question authorized State laws to forbid the
bringing into the State at all. This follows from the fact that
if arrival means crossing the line, then the act of crossing into the
State would be a violation of the State law, and hence necessarily
the operation of the law, is to forbid crossing the line and to com-
pel remaining beyond the same. Thus, if the construction of
the word 'arrival' be that which is claimed for it, it must be held
that the State statute attached and operated beyond the State line
confessedly before the time when it was intended by the Act of
Congress it should take effect."
"But the subtle signification of words and the niceties of verbal
distinction furnish no safe guide for construing the Act of Con-
gress. On the contrary, it should be interpreted and enforced
by the light of the fundamental rule of carrying out its purpose
and object, of affording the remedy which it was intended to
,create, and of defeating the wrong which it was its purpose to
frustrate. Undoubtedly the purpose of the Act was to enable
the laws of the several States to control the character of mer-
chandise therein enumerated at an earlier date than would have
been otherwise the case, but it is equally unquestionable that the
Act of Congress manifests no purpose to confer upon the States
the power to give their statutes an extra-territorial operation so
as to subject persons and property beyond their borders to the
Testraint of their laws. If the Act of Congress be construed as
reaching the contract for interstate shipment made in another
State the necessary effect must be to give to the laws of the
several State extra-territorial operation, for, as held in the Bow-
inan Case, the inevitable consequence of allowing a State law to
forbid interstate shipments of merchandise would be to destroy
the right to contract beyond the limits of the State for such ship-
'ments. If the construction claimed be upheld, it would be in
the power of 'each State to compel every interstate commerce
train to stop before crossing its borders, and discharge its freight,
lest by crossing the line it might carry within the State mer-
chandise of the character named covered by the inhibitions of a
'State statute."
"If it has been the intention of the Act of Congress to provide
for the stoppage at the State line of every interstate commerce
.contract relating to the merchandise named in the Act, such pur-
pose would have been easy of expression. The fact that such
power was not conveyed, and that, on the contrary, the language
of the statute relates to the receipt of the goods 'into any State
or Territory for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein,' nega-
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tives the correctness of the interpretation holding that the re-
ceipt into any State or Territory for the purposes named could
never take place. Light is thrown upon the purpose and spirit
of the Act by another consideration. The Bowman Case was
decided in 1888, the opinion in Leisy v. Hardin was announced
in April, 1890, the Act under consideration was approved August
8, 189o. Considering these dates, it is reasofiable to infer that
the provisions of the Act were intended by Congress to cause the
legislative authority of the respective States to attach to intoxi-
cating liquors coming into the States by an interstate shipment
only after the consummation of the shipment, but before the saler
of the merchandise, that is, that the one receiving merchandise of
the character named, whilst retaining the full right to use the
same, should no longer enjoy the right to sell free from the
restrictions as to sale created by State legislation, a right which
the decision in Leisy v. Hardin had just previously declared to.
exist.
"This view gives meaning and effect to the language of the-Act providing that such merchandise 'shall not be exempt there-
from' (legislative power of the State) by reason of being intro-
duced therein in 'original packages or otherwise.' These words
have no place or meaning in the Act if its purpose was to attach
the power of the State to the goods before the termination of the
interstate commerce shipment. The words 'original packages'
had, at the time of the passage of the Act by the decisions of this
Court acquired with reference to the construction of the Con-
stitution a technical meaning, signifying that the merchandise in
such packages was entitled to be sold within a State by the re-
ceiver thereof, although State laws might forbid the sale of mer-
chandise of like character not in such packages.
"Whilst it is true that the right to sell free from State inter-ference interstate commerce merchandise was held in Leisy v.
Hardin to be an essential incident to interstate commerce, it was.
yet but an incident, as the contract of sale within a State in its
nature was usually subject to the control of the legislative
authority of the State. On the other hand, the right to contract
for the transportation of merchandise from one State into or-
across another involved interstate commerce in its fundamental
aspect, and imported in its very essence a relation which neces-
sarily must be governed by laws apart from the laws of the
several States, since it embraced a contract which must come
under the laws of more than one State. The 'purpose of Con-
gress to submit the incidental power to- sell to the dominion of
State authority should not without the clearest implication be
held to imply the purpose of subjecting to State laws a contract
which in its very object and nature was not susceptible of such
regulation even if the constitutional right to do so existed, as to.
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which no opinion is expressed. And this view is cogently illus-
trated by the opinion in the Bowman Case.
"And it was doubtless this construction which caused the
Court to observe in the opinion In re Rahrer (Wilkerson v-
Rahrer), 140 U. S., 562 (35: 577), that the Act of Congress
'divests them (objects of interstate commerce shipment) of that
character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be
the case.' We think that interpreting the statute by the light of
all its provisions, it was not intended to and did not cause the
power of the State to attach to an interstate commerce shipment,
whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and
until its arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to
the consignee, and of course this conclusion renders it entirely
unnecessary to consider whether if the Act of Congress had sub-
mitted the right to make interstate commerce shipments to state
control it would be repugnant to the Constitution."
The same reasoning was applied to the delivery of liquor C.
0. D. in the case of Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S., 133,
decided in 1905.
The latest case upon the subject and one effecting a carrier
is L. & N. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S., 70, decided on
January 22, 1912. A carrier refused a shipment of liquor
offered to it in Indiana destined to certain counties in Kentucky
which were by the laws of the latter State dry. The railroad
was enjoined from refusing the shipment and the Court sus-
tained the injunction, holding that the Kentucky act making such
shipments unlawful was an unlawful regulation of commerce.
The Congress has attempted to do all in its power to aid the
States in the enforcement of their liquor laws by the provisions
in the penal code regulating C. 0. D. shipments, Section 238,
making it unlawful and a crime to deliver liquor to other than
the bona fide consignee, or upon his written order, and Section
239 making it a crime for a carrier'or other person to collect the
purchase price of interstate shipments of liquor or to act as the
agent of the buyer or seller of such liquor, while Section 240
requires under penalty that shipments of liquor between States
be plainly marked as to consignee, and as to the nature and quan-
tity of the contents.
So then, at the date of the passage 'f the Webb Act it may be
taken as the established law.
(i) That intoxicating liquors have been divested of the inter-
state attribute to the extent and to the extent only of enabling
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State laws to effect them in the original package or otherwise
after they have reached their destination and are delivered to the
consignee.
(2) That a State law cannot operate upon such shipments at
the border of a State when their destination is to a point within
the border.
(3) That an interstate carrier, or its agents, cannot be inter-
fered with in transporting such shipments to their destination
and in delivering them to the consignee.
(4) That an interstate carrier cannot refuse to accept and
-carry intoxicating liquors from one State into a prohibited State,
the plea of the law of the prohibited State being no defense to
such refusal.
The Webb Act, as stated by its sponsor, Senator Kenyon, was
passed to meet the question left open in the cases of Rahrer and
the Iowa case, "whether if an Act of Congress had submitted the
right to make interstate commerce shipments to State control it
would be repugnant to the Constitution," and Attorney General
Wickersham in his opinion, upon which President Taft based his
veto, assumed that the bill squarely presented the question. Mr.
Taft's veto was based upon the theory as established by the de-
cided cases, "That it (the Webb Act) is in substance and effect
a delegation by Congress to the States of the power of regulating
interstate commerce in liquors which is vested exclusively in
Congress," citing the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing
Co., 223 U. S., 70, decided January 22, 1912.
This case, as has been before stated, was brought against a
carrier for refusing to accept for shipment liquor from Indiana
into counties in Kentucky which were by the laws of that State
dry. The railroad was enjoined from so refusing to accept such
shipments, since such statutes of a State as applied to interstate
shipments are an unlawful regulation of commerce.
Mr Taft further stated that Congress had aided the States
-under the Penal Code, Sections 238, 239, 240, above referred to.
Mr. Wickersham, the Attorney-General, based his opinion not
so much upon the unconstitutionality of the delegation of a power
of the United States to a State as upon the extra-territorial effect
which the statute gives to State laws with respect to contracts.
Such a statute gives to a State the right to subject persons and
property beyond their borders to the restraint of their laws.
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The Attorney-General considered the effect of such a statute
as his reason for its unconstitutionality, following the reasoning
of the Bowman Case that "the inevitable consequence of allowing
a State law to forbid interstate shipments of merchandise would
be to destroy the right to contract beyond the limits of the State
for such shipments."
Though the effect of the Act may be unconstitutional, yet the
stronger and more basic principle upon which the unconstitution-
ality of the Webb Act must.be determined is as Mr. Taft said,
the inability of Congress to delegate its power over interstate
commerce to a State.
The Attorney-General did not consider the effect of the limita-
tion of the word "intent" as used in the Act further than to say:
"If, therefore, the law of any State shall prohibit absolutely the
possession or use of liquor within the State, then under this bill
the mere introduction of liquor across the boundary line of the
State would be conclusive evidence of an intention to violate that
law, and would subject the carrier and all persons interested
therein to penalties imposed by the State law."
But the Attorney General has perhaps gone too far in saying
that the mere introduction of liquor across the State line would
be conclusive evidence of an intention to violate the law. When
intent is an element of a wrong, it is never presumed, more
especially in the case of crime. The shipper or carrier would
have to have knowledge that the law was to be violated, and the
State prosecuting would then have to lay a scienter in order to
hold him amenable to its laws.
The Webb Act does not, as the Lottery Act, the game laws
of March 25, 19oo, known as the Lacey Act, or as the "White
Slave" Act, create outlaws of commerce forbidden to be trans-
ported between the States; it is simply an attempt to aid certain
States in the enforcement of laws which they deem vital to the
interests of their citizens. It is hard to see how the mere car-
riage by an interstate carrier can make the agent amenable to the
laws of the individual State.
Congress undoubtedly could have made intoxicants an outlaw
of commerce (Bowmnan v. Chicago, 125 U. S., at page 489) and
prohibited their carriage in interstate shipments, but it did not
do so. It could not under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution have said that liquor shall not be carried into such
and such a State. What it has done is to say that the United
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States will permit any State to exercise the prerogative of the
United States and deprive liquor of its interstate attributes and
thus enable it to enforce its local laws. In doing so it clearly-
delegates its sovereign power over commerce to the individual
States, a thing which it as clearly is unable to do.
Such, therefore, is the "interstate commerce character" of in-
toxicating liquors which the Webb Act purports to divest in cer-
tain cases. To accomplish this divestiture, the shipment or
transportation of intoxicating liquors intended by any person in-
terested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner
used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of'
the law of any State, is prohibited. The clause relating to the
shipment or transportation is evidently intended to make of no
effect the rule laid down in the Iowa case, that the laws of the
State cannot attach to the interstate shipment while it is in transit
or until it has reached its place of destination in the hands of the
consignee. In other words, that the laws of a State in such
cases shall be co-extensive with the State jurisdiction, and that
the laws shall fasten upon the shipment at the border of the State.
Should this provision of the Act be valid, then the interstate car-
rier or other person who should transport liquors within the bor-
der of the prohibited State would then immediately become
amenable to the laws of the State and become a party in the
illegal transaction. This effect of the law would give the State
the right to control interstate shipments in liquor within its bor-
der absolutely, and carry with it the incidental right to control the
contracts made in another State for the shipment of liquors to
the prohibited State. This provision of the Act would
therefore annul the principle which was established in the Iowa
case, that the laws of a -State can have no extra-territorial effect,
and that though a contract may be made in one State where there
were no restrictions on the sale or transportation of liquor, for
the carriage of liquor into a prohibited State beyond, the pro-
visions of it could not be carried out by the carrier or other per-
son. But this provision of the Act is somewhat modified by the
further clause that the liquor so shipped or transported shall be
intended by any person interested therein to be received, pos-
sessed, sold or in any manner used, in violation of any law of the
State to which it was consigned. This would add the question
of knowledge on the part of the carrier or other person that such
a shipment was to be used in the. prohibited State in violation of
law, and it would be necessary for the prosecutor to establish the
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fact of knowledge on the part of the carrier or other person of
such intended use. It would seem that, under this provision of
the act, liquo- could be seized immediately upon its crossing the
border of a prohibited State by the authorities and taken out of
the possession of the carrier or other person, pending the deter-
mination of the intent. In order to hold a carrier amenable to
the laws of the State of consignment under this act, it would be
necessary for the State authorities to show that it knew or should
have known that the intoxicating liquor was intended to be re-
ceived, possessed, sold or in any manner used contrary to the law
of the State into which it was' being shipped, and the question
would then arise, what would constitute knowledge on the part
of the carrier of such inthftl6h? The mere quantity of liquor
shipped would not be aity 6i-itrion, because a large distributor
may order a great quantity of liqtof, every bit of which shall be
intended ultimately for medicinal use. In fact, a case can be
imagined in which the c'onsigride may require large quantities of
liquor and have no other persoris f6r -his customers than hospitals
or physicians.
In order to sustain the Webb Act a generation of strong de-
cisions will have to be oVefruled, the theory of interstate com-
merce control as the exclusive prerogative of the United States
will have to be abandoned and *State laws given an extra-territor-
ial effect co-extensive with the Union,---a combination of oppos-
ing forces with which the Webb Act does not seem robust enough
to contend. Allen H. Kerr.
Of the Allegheny County (Pa.) Bar.
NOTE.
So marked a divergence of sentiment has arisen touching the
constitutionality of the Webb Act that in the interests of a strictly
impartial view it is thought well to add a brief note to our con-
tributor's very able pregentation of the subject. Can Congress
constitutionally divest intoxicating liquors of their interstate
character where shipped into the State to be there used contrary
to local regulation? This is the object of the' carefully framed
bill finally enacted in March, f9 13. Viewing the matter in its
historical development we first find the Supreme Court affirming
the State's right to regtilate the'importatibn and sale by imposing
a license tax (License Cases, 5 Howard, 5o4). Subsequently.
this right being denied (Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S., 165; fol-
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lowed by Leisy v. Ha'din, 135 U. S., ioo), Congress in the
Wilson Act conferred a capacity of self-protection upon the
States which finally resulted in the Court's practical re-affirmation
(Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S., 472) of the well-considered license
case doctrine, and lastly Congress in the Webb Bill declared in-
toxicating liquors shall lose their character as interstate mer-
chandise where shipped into the State to be employed in violation
of the State's law. The Webb Act, consequently, would appear
to be a wholly appropriate step. in a course of constitutional de-
velopment initiated in the License Cases by judicial opinions
whose wisdom at last comes into its own.
In Rhodes v. Iowa (170 U, S., 412, 420), the present Chief
Justice of the United States delivering the opinion of the Court,
said: "It is not gainsaid that the effect of the Act of Congress
was to deprive the receiver of goods shipped from another State
of all power to sell the same in the State of Iowa in violation of
its laws, but whilst it is thus conceded that the Act of Congress
has allowed the Iowa law to attach to the property when brought
into the State before sale, when it would otherwise not have done
so until after sale, on the other hand, it is contended that the Act
of Congress in no way provides that the laws of Iowa should
apply before the consummation by delivery of the interstate com-
merce transaction." The point in the Rhodes case being that
the case containing liquor had been landed upon the station plat-
form of Brighton, Iowa, and subsequently moved a few feet
across the platform to be placed in the freight house for delivery
to the consignee, the Court holding that "moving such goods in
the station from the platform on which they are put on arrival to
the freight warehouse is a part of the interstate commerce trans-
portation." In the Phillips case above cited, Mr. Justice Peckham
delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said: "The sale
of liquors is confessedly a subject of police regulation. Such
sale may be absolutely prohibited, or the business may be con-
trolled and regulated by the imposition of license taxes, by which
those only. who obtain licenses are permitted to engage in it."
But the power to tax, as said long ago by Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall, is the power to destroy. It would seem entirely plain that
in its most recent exercise of legislative discretion Congress has
sought to exercise its constitutional control over interstate and
foreign commerce by placing under the judicial doctrine of the
License Cases the full strength of the Federal legislative arm.
G. E. Sherman.
